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Intangible Investment and Market Valuation 
 
Abstract 
This study derives performance- and expenditure-based estimates of intangible capital and 
measures the extent to which intangible capital is captured by the equity market measures of firm 
value. Intangible capital is evaluated using occupational information available in the Finnish 
linked employer-employee data for the 1997-2011 period. The performance-based organizational 
investment in value added is approximately 3%, and R&D and ICT investment shares are lower, 
at 1.5%, and all are clustered in intangible-intensive sectors that represent 40% of the private 
sector. Expenditure-based organizational capital also exists in clusters other than that intensively 
investing in managerial and marketing effort, and performance-based R&D capital is 
concentrated in the cluster with intensive R&D activity; both increase the market value of firms 
beyond the level that can be explained by standard economic analysis. 
 
JEL classification: O32, O30, J30, J42, M12 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the performance of own account production of intangible goods of the 
following types: organizational capital, research and development (R&D) and information and 
communications technology (ICT). The benchmark approach is the expenditure-based approach, 
which utilizes a measure of innovation input rather than innovation output. We evaluate not only 
R&D and ICT capital but also organizational capital, the value of which can be poorly reflected 
in book values. An increasing number of expenditures on management and marketing need to be 
recognized as intangible investments that increase productivity over a longer period. This type of 
organizational investment is more clearly firm specific and owned by the firm to a greater extent 
than other types of intangibles (Youndt, Subramaniam and Snell, 2004; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 
2003 and 2005).  
 
R&D expenditures, in turn, were recently included in the U.S. GDP in addition to a category 
called entertainment, literary and artistic originals, and R&D expenditures will be included in 
many EU countries’ GDP in 2014. Investments in information and communications technology 
(ICT) complement R&D and organizational investment, as found in Ito and Krueger (1996) and 
Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999). Simply, R&D investment dominates in early phase of creation 
of new products and services, while management and marketing abilities are needed when the 
product is put on sales. Due to the high degree of complementarity, intangible investments are 
analyzed in separate clusters that differ in the intensity of their use of the various intangibles. The 
organizational-capital-intensive cluster primarily consists of wholesale, retail, information and 
transportation firms. Organizational capital, however, plays a less important role in certain fixed-
capital-intensive firms listed on the Helsinki stock exchange. R&D-capital-intensive clusters are 
dominated by parts of construction, machinery and equipment and electrical equipment but also 
include some large service-sector firms. Clusters also differ in how different types of intangibles 
complement each other.  
 
The expenditure-based measure used in the INNODRIVE project and described by Görzig, 
Piekkola and Riley (2010) utilizes the occupational structures of firms and assumes that a certain 
fraction of organizational, R&D and ICT workers are engaged in the production of intangible 
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goods irrespective of the industry/cluster.1 The value of the necessary intermediate and capital 
costs in the own-account production of intangible capital goods is evaluated, which differs from 
the widely adopted approach developed by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2009). The 
performance-based approach employs the Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (HNT) (1999) 
methodology to infer a measure of the marginal products of intangible types of labor. 
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) and Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2010) also consider these 
marginal products. The novelty in this paper is the evaluation of rents from intangible capital 
investment in conjunction with the output elasticities of the respective intangibles to form new 
performance-based estimates of intangible investments and capital. Most of the ICT literature 
analyzes either the marginal product (Morrison, 1997; Gera, Gu and Lee, 1999) or the elasticity 
(Stiroh, 2005), but not both. 
 
The output elasticity of R&D observed by Griliches (1979, 1984) ranges from 10% in the 
research-intensive sectors to 4% for the rest of U.S. manufacturing, which is similar to the figure 
we obtained in the R&D-intensive cluster when controlling for fixed effects. The output 
elasticities of R&D capital in Cuneo and Mairesse (1984) and Mairesse and Cuneo (1985) are 
higher, ranging between 9% and 33% in France, and the output elasticity is 15.3% in the UK 
(O'Mahony, Vecchi 2009). Ignoring organizational capital is likely to bias these estimates of R&D 
elasticity upwards, while a downward bias may emerge from either an overly broad definition of 
R&D effort or counting the labor used in the production of intangible assets in other areas. We 
avoid the bias resulting from omitting other intangibles by relying on occupational data. The 
latter biases are also mitigated because workers have only one profession, and hence R&D 
activity cannot overlap with other activities. Moreover, the performance-based approach also 
adjusts for the share of intangible work that is creating future intangible investment goods. 
 
A Tobin’s q valuation model, following Hall et al. (2007), is linked with a residual income 
valuation model that was further improved by Ohlson (1995). The intuition is that the financial 
markets assign a valuation to the bundle of firms’ tangible and intangible assets, which is equal to 
the present discounted value of future cash flows. The research question is whether intangible 
capital yields additional information that can explain the valuation of the firm beyond that 
explained by economic forecasts, which we find to be the case. 
                                                 
 
1 See the INNODRIVE project website, at http://www.innodrive.org. 
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Section 2 of the paper discusses the composition of intangible capital and presents the data. 
Section 3 provides the calculation of intangible capital and methodology in the expenditure-based 
approach and section 4 in the performance-based approach. Section 5 incorporates intangible 
capital into a valuation model. Section 6 provides the conclusions. 
 
2. Intangible capital components and data 
Organizational capital includes the competence of the top management and human resources, as 
well as that of marketing and sales efforts. The organizational structure of a firm’s own-account 
production in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (CHS) (2005) is measured according to a 
predetermined share of management expenditures (20%) in total wage compensation. Market 
research activities, however, are not measured using expenditures on marketing personnel but by 
the size of the marketing industry in the System of National Accounts or by using private sources 
from media companies, as in Marrano and Haskel (2006). 
 
This paper evaluates intangible investment from the perspective of occupational structure using 
linked employer–employee data that have been used extensively in the human capital formation 
literature, beginning with Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). These data are convenient for 
use in an analysis that relies on the valuation of different tasks and occupations. The labor data 
are from the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers with 9.6 million person-year and 
68,754 firm-year observations for the years 1996–2011. The data include a rich set of variables 
covering compensation, education, and professions in the private sector. The non-production 
employees receive salaries, and the production workers, 36% of all workers, receive an hourly 
wage. Employee compensation is evaluated based on both hourly wages and annual earnings 
(which include performance-related pay and social security taxes). 
 
The occupational codes in the Confederation of Finnish Industries labor data can be transformed 
into the International Standard Classification of Occupations by International Labour 
Organization (ISCO-88). The occupations in manufacturing and services have different 
classifications and, ultimately, we have 41 non-production worker occupations, which are listed in 
Appendix A. Organizational compensation is obtained from the occupations that are classified as 
relating to organizational capital—management (all executive level work), marketing, purchases, 
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media and financial administrative work performed—and dropping those employees with the 
lowest qualifications.2 In R&D, the categorization of workers is broad and includes all with 
higher tertiary level technical education if the occupation code does not indicate another type of 
intangible (IC) work.3 
 
Employee data are linked to the financial statistics data provided by the private company Suomen 
Asiakastieto4 and include information on profits, value added, and capital intensity (fixed assets) 
for domestic firms. To eliminate firms with unreliable balance sheets, we only include firms that 
have real domestic sales exceeding €1.5 million (in 2000 consumer prices) in the analysis. The 
final linked employer–employee dataset of 6.66 million person-year observations annually covers 
an average of 2,276 firms with 33,808 firm-year observations for the 1997-2011 period and 
covers 53% of the turnover of Finnish companies in 2011. The employee data in the sample have 
an annual average of 447,000 employees (the original employee data covered 580,000 employees 
for the respective period), that is, one-third of the total private-sector workforce. Figure 1 
presents the share of workers in occupations related to production and intangible capital in the 
linked employer-employee data (LEED). The micro data are aggregated to be representative at 
the business sector level. The figures are adjusted for the difference between the number of firms 
in the LEED data and that in the entire private sector from Statistics Finland in five turnover-
size, one-digit industry classes.5 
 
                                                 
 
2 The fourth and lowest category is the implementation level; the others are the executive level, the senior expert level and the 
expert level. 
3 The inclusion of all workers with higher technical education doubles the number of R&D workers in manufacturing and 
increases their share in services by 30%. 
4 Suomen Asiakastieto is the leading business and credit information company in Finland. 
5 In the aggregation, the following categories are used in each one-digit industry: 1 turnover under 2 million Euros, 2 turnover 
between 2 and 10 million Euros, 3 turnover between 10 and 40 million Euros, 4 turnover between 40 and 200 million Euros, and 
5 turnover over 200 million Euros (in year 2000 consumer prices). 
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Figure 1. Share of private-sector employees engaged in work related to intangible capital in 
Finland (1996–2011) 
 
The shares of organizational occupations were generally approximately 8.8%. Management 
(3.4%) and marketing (5.4%) are the main categories for organizational work. The share of R&D 
workers is similar, at 7.1% (or 4.2% if those with higher tertiary technical education but not 
directly employed in an OC, ICT or R&D occupation are excluded). The total share of ICT 
workers is approximately 2.1%.6 The increasing share of intangible-capital related workers is 
explained by the falling share of production workers, from approximately 50% to 28%. The 
17.8% share of personnel in organizational, R&D and ICT work in 2003 is comparable to the 
average share of 18% in the six European countries with LEED data in INNODRIVE. 
Management and marketing occupations are closely related, and the definitional distinctions 
between these occupations vary across countries. Management wage expenses alone, without 
                                                 
 
6 Most ICT work is concentrated in the following industries: computers, software, and electronic equipment; finance; healthcare, 
medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals; and telecommunications, telephone and TV transmission. The highest share of ICT 
workers in total intangible workers is in the fixed-capital- and organizational-capital-intensive cluster. 
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accounting for marketing wage expenses – as in the procedure for calculating the national 
measures of intangible capital – may offer a less comparable basis for an analysis of 
organizational capital across countries. Table 1 presents a summary of the variables in the 
estimation sample. 
 
Table 1. Summary of variables 
Variable Mean Std Median Obs 
Value added factor prices (in 1000s) 21,992 104,169 4,118 33488 
Value added growth 3.6 % 44.0 % 0 26452 
Turnover (in 1000s) 59,906 279,557 9,862 33808 
Employment 197 795 45 33808 
Employees in organizational work 15 66 2 33808 
Organizational worker share 9.7 % 15.0 % 3.9 % 33808 
Employees in R&D work 13 73 1 33808 
R&D worker share 6.3 % 13.0 % 0.9 % 33808 
Employees in ICT work 4 29 0 33808 
ICT worker share 1.4 % 6.8 % 0.0 % 33808 
Annual earnings (in 1000s) 30 10 30 33808 
Hourly wage 12 3 11 33807 
Organizational compensation (in 1000s) 740 3151 109 33808 
Organizational compensation per value added 3.6 % 0.4 % 3.7 % 33731 
R&D compensation (in 1000s) 547 3185 30 33808 
R&D compensation per value added 2.7 % 0.4 % 2.5 % 33731 
ICT compensation (in 1000s) 175 1373 0 33808 
ICT compensation per value added 0.9 % 0.1 % 0.9 % 33731 
Fixed capital (in 1000s) 43084 401235 1685 33808 
Materials (in 1000s) 1761 11763 42 33488 
New value added, turnover, fixed capital, and materials are deflated at 2000 producer prices. New value added in the 
table is the sum of the operating margin, employment compensation, and an effective value added tax of 19.9% of 
the expenditure-based estimates of intangible capital. Annual earnings, hourly wages, and compensation for 
organizational, R&D and ICT work are deflated using a wage index. 
 
The average value added is €26 million, and the growth in average value added is 3.6% (in 2000 
producer prices). The average total organizational compensation of €740 thousand exceeds the 
total of R&D and ICT compensation of €722 thousand. We observe intangible work occupations 
in 75% of all firms irrespective of size (organizational activity for 71% of the firms and R&D 
activity for 51% of the firms). These figures also capture small firms with only one or two 
workers engaged in intangible capital activities (the median is one worker in R&D and ICT 
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activities and two in organizational activities). This result indicates that R&D investments can be 
observed for many companies, whereas, for example in Sandner and Block (2011), R&D 
investments are only observed for 41% of the companies considered. 
 
3. The methodology for the expenditure-based approach 
The methodology for the expenditure-based approach is also described in Görzig, Piekkola and 
Riley (GPR) (2010). The basic concept is that each firm produces the following two types of 
intangible goods that are directed toward the firm’s own use: organizational R&D (research and 
development) and ICT (information and communication technologies). Some share of the 
intangible employees is engaged in the production of intangible goods with a service life of over 
one year and the rest are engaged in current production (consumption). Alternatively, part of the 
working time is devoted to intangible production. To evaluate the values of the intermediate and 
capital costs related to the labor costs incurred in the production of intangible capital goods, the 
following industries in category 7 of the Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community (Nace Rev. 2) have been selected: 
 
  • Other business activities (Nace 71), as a proxy for organizational competencies, 
  • Research and development (Nace 72), as a proxy for R&D goods, and  
  • Computer and related activities (Nace 62), as a proxy for ICT goods. 
 
Expenditure-based calculations have been performed for each type of intangible expenditure 
IC=OC; R&D; ICT. Production of intangible goods (investment) of type IC, uses labor, capital 
and intermediate input. The nominal value of intangible capital investment of type IC is given by 
 
 N IC IC ICt it itP N M wL?  with , & ,IC OC R D ICT? , (1) 
 
where labor costs are multiplied by ICM , the combined multiplier, to assess the total investment 
expenditures on intangibles (as discussed below), and ICitwL  denotes nominal annual earnings. 
The parameter NtP is the investment deflator in business services (Nace 74 excluding 746), which 
is assumed to represent the deflator for intangible assets in all sectors. The combined multiplier 
ICM  is the product of the shares of organizational, R&D and ICT work that produce intangible 
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goods and a factor multiplier depending on the intermediate and capital costs related to (one) unit 
of labor costs. We employ annual earnings instead of hourly wages because they include 
performance-related pay and the workers in managerial positions are not paid for overtime hours 
and their recorded hours are therefore lower than the actual value. The real stock ICtR  of 
intangible capital of type IC for a firm i (or at cluster level j) is given by 
 
 1 1 0 0
IC IC IC IC IC
t t IC t IC ICR R ( ) N , R ( ) N ( ) / ( g )? ??? ? ? ? ? , (2) 
where (0)ICN  is the initial investment, (0)ICR  is the initial intangible capital stock, IC?  is the 
depreciation rate and ICg  is the growth of the intangible capital stock of type IC using the 
geometric sum formula. The initial intangible investment (0)ICN  is operationalized as the 
average investment over the five-year period following the first observation year. The average is 
used to assess the average investment rate over the business cycle. The growth rate ICg  is set at 
2%, which follows the sample average growth rate (2%) of real wage costs for intangible-capital-
related activities. 
GPR provide the value of a combined multiplier ICM  (the product of the shares of 
organizational, R&D and ICT work that produce intangible goods and a factor multiplier). The 
factor multiplier from the intermediate and capital costs related to (one) unit of labor costs is a 
weighted average of the factor multipliers for Germany (40% weight), the UK (30% weight), 
Finland (15% weight), and the Czech Republic and Slovenia (both 7.5% weights). 7 The factor 
multiplier is thus set to be representative for the entire EU27 area. Purchased intangibles are 
included in intermediates, and hence the fixed factor multiplier assumes that the ratio of 
purchased to own account capital in the production of own-account intangible goods is identical 
across firms. We focused on the own-account production of intangible goods and excluded the 
purchased intangible capital apart from that employed as an input in the production of own-
account intangibles. Purchased intangible capital represents half of all intangible capital in the EU 
27 countries according to the national estimates by Joni-Lasino and Iommi (2010), but this figure 
will overlap with own-account intangibles when used as intermediate inputs. 
 
                                                 
 
7 These were the countries with LEED data in INNODRIVE. The input-output tables are from the EU KLEMS database, which 
is the product of the 6th framework research project financed by the European Commission to analyze productivity in the 
European Union at the industry level. 
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The share of workers producing intangible goods is set at 40% for organizational occupations 
(double the share used in GPR), 70% for R&D occupations and 50% for ICT occupations. The 
factor multipliers employed to account for the use of capital and intermediate inputs are 1.76 for 
organizational wage expenses, 1.55 for R&D wage expenses and 1.48 for ICT wage expenses. If 
Finnish input-output tables had been used (instead of the weighted average over six countries), 
the factor multipliers would decline to 1.56 for organizational investment, 1.31 for R&D and 1.37 
for ICT investment. Table 2 summarizes the combined multiplier ICM  (the product of the share 
of work devoted to IC production and the factor multiplier) and the depreciation rates used.  
 
Table 2. OC and R&D&I combined multipliers in the expenditure-based approach and 
depreciation 
 OC R&D ICT 
Employment shares 40% 70% 50 
Combined multiplier ICM  70% 110% 70% 
Depreciation rate ? IC  20% production 
25% services 
15% 
 
33% 
 
Overall, organizational and ICT investments represent 70% of wage costs in the respective 
occupations (in ICT, the figure is an approximation of the combined multiplier of 0.74). In R&D 
activities, the total wage costs are similar to approximations of total investments, with a 
combined multiplier of 110%. Recent estimates of depreciation from surveys by Whittard et al. 
(2009) and Awano et al. (2010) indicate that the R&D depreciation rate is closer to 15% than the 
20% figure used in CHS. The depreciation rate for organizational investments is set at 20% in 
production, while the higher depreciation rate of 25% employed by CHS is retained in services. 
This higher rate is used because the life cycle of an organizational investment is longer in 
production (2.9-5.4 years) than in services (2.6-4 years) and branding and reputational efforts are 
higher in services and are relatively short lived. ICT investments face a 33% depreciation rate. 
 
 
4. The methodology in the performance-based approach 
The performance-based approach analyzed here assumes a constant returns-to-scale (CRTS) 
production function using the expenditure-based estimate as a starting point. Following the 
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approach used by Griliches (1967) and HNT (1999), the effective labor input is quality adjusted 
for the productivity (rent) of organizational, R&D and ICT workers. Estimating production 
provides information on marginal productivity of IC workers and the output elasticities. 
Estimation is done by clusters and therefore release the assumption of a common technology 
which would lead to biased estimates. Another reason is the correlation between intangible assets 
– in particular in those with few intangibles – and therefore in some clusters intangible capital 
inputs are used as a whole in the production function estimation. Clusters are determined 
depending on organizational, R&D, ICT and fixed capital investment as a share of factor inputs 
employed (which also include labor costs). The partition cluster method divides firms into non-
overlapping groups using the deviation of median values from the average. Each observation is 
assigned to the group with the closest median and, based on that grouping, new group means are 
determined. The procedure continues until no observations change groups. The clusters are thus 
characterized by varying factor input intensities. 
Service and production industries are first treated as a separate heterogeneous group that is not 
included in the clustering analysis: agriculture, finance, public administration, education, health, 
arts, entertainment and recreation and rest (Nace industries A, K, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, and X). 
Clustering the remaining firms results in four optimal clusters with other industries as the fifth 
cluster, see table A.2 in Appendix A.8 The clusters are (i) fixed capital intensive with a mean 90% 
factor input share of fixed investment and a 17% share of private-sector value added, (ii) fixed 
capital and organizational capital intensive, where the respective factor input shares are 57% for 
fixed investment and 26.5% for organizational investment and with a 27% share of private-sector 
value added, (iii) R&D intensive with a mean 57.2% factor input share and 25% private-sector 
value added share, (iv) organizational capital (OC) intensive with a mean 68.4% factor input share 
and 14% private-sector value added share and (v) the industries that were not clustered with a 
17% private-sector value added share. The value added shares of the clusters thus range from 
14% for the OC-incentive cluster to 27% for the fixed-capital and OC-incentive cluster. The OC 
intensive cluster is dominated by (wholesale) trade, information, transportation and the R&D-
intensive cluster by construction, machinery and equipment, electrical equipment and scientific 
R&D.  
The explanatory variable is value added and includes investments in all types of intangibles 
IC
it it itIC
Y VALADD N? ?? for firm i in year t. The production function for firm i in cluster j allows 
the quality-adjustment of labor itq  to change from year to year and is given by 
                                                 
 
8 Four clusters were optimal according to the Calinski et al. (1974) criterion. 
12 
 
 
    ? ?0 ICjLj Kjbb bICit j it it it it itICY b ( q L ) R K exp( e )? ? ,  (3) 
where 1Lj ICj Kj
IC
b b b? ? ?? , it itq L is quality-adjusted labor ( itL  is the total number of employees, 
and itq  is the quality index), ICitR  refers to the capital stocks of an intangible asset of type IC=OC, 
R&D and ICT, itK  is tangible capital (plant, property and equipment), and eit is an error term. 
Following the analysis of the productivity of intangible workers as in HNT, quality-adjusted labor 
is  
 
 
1 1
IC ,NON IT IC IC
it it j it it itIC IC
IC
IC ,NON IT it
it jIC
it
q L L ( L L )
LL ( )
L
a
a
?
?
? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
? ,  (4) 
where itq  denotes the quality adjustment due to marginal productivity in occupations of type IC. 
The relative rent (marginal productivity) of IC occupations differs from that of the other workers 
in cluster j by a factor ,IC NON ICja
? , which should be compared with the wage ratio for IC 
occupations relative to non-IC occupations in cluster ,IC NON ICjw ? . We can approximately write in 
log form ,log log 1 ( 1) /IC NON IC ICit j it itICq a L L
?? ?? ? ?? ??
 
?  ,( 1) /IC NON IC ICj it itIC a L L
? ?? , as the 
number of workers in organizational, R&D and ICT occupations is a minor share of all workers 
(the second term in squared brackets does not deviate significantly from zero). Using this log 
form combined with (3) and (4) yields 
 0
IC
ICit
it Lj it LICj ICj it Kj itIC IC
it
LlnY lnb b ln L b b ln R b ln K
L
? ? ? ? ?? ? , (5) 
where ? ?1IC ,NON ITLICj Lj jb b a ?? ? . One approach is to assume that the relative wages align with the 
relative marginal productivity IC ,NON IT IC ,NON ITj ja w? ?? . This assumption assumes that the labor 
market (or factor input market for intangibles) is competitive. In other words, employees receive 
no rents from production. Note that ICitL  is used in the construction of 
IC
itR , but this would not 
affect the outcome because workers capture no rents. We assume that the factor input markets in 
the production of intangibles may not be competitive. In particular, firms may have some 
monopsony power in the labor market and capture some rents. We measure rents using  
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jt
IC ,NON IT
jIC
IC ,NON IT
jt
a
z
w
?
?? ,  (6) 
where 1IC ,NON ITj LICj Lja b / b
? ? ? . If ICjtz >1 the relative marginal productivity of an intangible 
worker of type IC to non-intangible workers is higher than the hourly wages of IC workers 
relative to non-intangible workers in year t. Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2013) found this to be the 
case, especially for high-productivity firms. The productivity-wage gap is thus explained by firm-
specific intangible and human capital that cannot be purchased from the market. In contrast, 
when the intangibles are more general and characterized by human capital the labor market is 
closer to perfect competition, and the rent multiplier ICjtz  should be closer to unity. Note that 
the monopsony power of firms in the intangible work labor market ensures that employees 
capture no rents and hence rents ICz  can be separately determined from intangible investment 
IC
itR , as labor costs are unaffected. 
The output elasticities ICjtbˆ  of IC capital reflect annual capital income shares under perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale 
 
R IC IC
jt j jt
ICjt Y
jt jt
P r R
bˆ
P Y
? , (7) 
where the rental rate ICjr  equals depreciation and the external rate of return of 4%, 
R
tP is the 
physical capital deflator in business services (71 in Nace rev. 1), which is assumed to represent 
the deflator for intangible capital in all sectors, YjtP is the producer price deflator, and ICjtbˆ  is  a  
constant for the time and industry under consideration. The perpetual inventory method from (2) 
implies that ? ?1IC IC ICjt jt IC IC jtN g ( ) R? ?? ? ? , where IC IC IC ICjt jt jt t jtg ( R R ) / R?? ?  is the growth rate of 
intangible capital observed in industry j. Solving this equation for ICjtR  and substituting in (7) 
provides 
 
     
1
R IC
t jt ICj
ICjt Y IC
jt jt jt IC IC
P N r
bˆ
P Y g ( )? ?? ? ?   (8) 
 
The nominal value of an intangible capital investment of type IC using the performance-based 
approach is given by 
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N IC IC IC IC
t jt jt jt jtP N z M wL?  (9) 
where IC ICjt jtz M  is the product of rents 
IC
jtz and the combined multiplier 
IC
jtM . Equations (8) and 
(9) yield 
1Y ICjt jt jt IC ICIC IC
jt jt ICj R N IC IC
t t jt j
P Y g ( )
z M b
( P / P ) rwL
? ?? ??  (10) 
Here, output elasticity ICjtbˆ  is proxied by the estimate for the entire period ICjb  (from (5) as given 
by the estimation of (11) below), and the intangible capital growth of type IC ICjtg  at any period is 
approximated by the growth implied by the expenditure-based estimates. The rent multiplier ICjtz  
from (6) and (10) also provides an estimate of the total multiplier *
ICjt
M =
IC IC
jt jtMz / *ICjtz . A higher 
intangible capital growth ICjtg  and a lower user cost of capital 
IC
jr  at a given level of intangible 
labor costs must be explained by an increase in either the rent ICjtz  or the combined multiplier 
IC
jtM . As in the expenditure-based approach, the combined multiplier depends on the share of 
workers engaged in the production of intangible capital of type IC and the use of other inputs 
(intermediates and capital); the performance-based approach does not directly indicate which of 
the two is subject to change.  
The estimation for each industry j and year t from (5) is provided by 9 
    0 ICitit Lj it LICj ICj ICit Kj it z jt it
IC ICit
'LlnY b b ln L b b ln K b ln K b X e
L
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ,  (11) 
where jtX  is the vector of control dummy variables (years and, in pooled estimates, their 
interaction terms with clusters), ? ?1ICLICj Lj jb b a? ?  and ite  is the residual error. The value added 
itY  is in real factor prices using producer prices as a deflator. The parameter itY  also includes the 
real investment in intangibles that are deflated by the investment deflator in business services. We 
prefer the fixed effects models to estimate (11) for all firms and at the cluster level while 
assuming time invariant rents and output elasticities, but we also present the random effect 
                                                 
 
9 Caves and Barton (1990) and Jorgenson, Griliches, and Intriligator (1986) provide details regarding the estimation of firm 
production functions with fixed effects. It must be acknowledged that ICjb  and therefore the rent multiplier 
IC
jtz  and the 
combined multiplier ICjtM  are also dependent on specification and measurement errors.  
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results. The Hausman specification test also reveals that fixed effects estimates should be 
preferred to random effect estimates in all clusters. 
Table 3 reports the pooled and cluster-level estimation results. The general finding is that 
organizational capital is productive in the organizational-capital-intensive cluster and R&D capital 
is productive in R&D-intensive clusters. In all other clusters, organizational capital has a 
particularly high correlation with ICT capital (approximately 0.65 in both the fixed-capital and 
OC-intensive cluster and in the R&D-intensive cluster) and organizational and ICT capital are 
estimated jointly. Table 3 indicates that the combined elasticities are reasonably high in the fixed- 
and OC-capital-intensive cluster. Additionally, all intangibles (including R&D) are considered as a 
whole in the other industries and in the fixed-capital-intensive clusters, where joint elasticities are 
low.  
Table 3. Production function fixed effect and random effect estimations: all and by clusters 
  All Fixe-capital intensive 
Fixed- and OC-capital 
intensive R&D-intensive OC-capital-intensive Other industries 
  Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
Employment 0.312*** 0.361*** 0.183*** 0.258*** 0.306*** 0.354*** 0.420*** 0.450*** 0.371*** 0.402*** 0.185*** 0.251*** 
 (45.09) (56.53) (14.82) (23.38) (20.57) (25.56) (24.55) (28.61) (20.34) (24.14) (10.86) (18.56) 
Relative rent OC 0.341*** 0.427*** - - - - - - 0.240*** 0.216** - - 
 (8.35) (10.95) - - - - - - (3.43) (3.23) - - 
Relative rent OC and ICT - - - - 0.535*** 0.691*** 0.427*** 0.334*** - - - - 
 - - - - (5.85) (7.86) (4.11) (3.48) - - - - 
Relative rent R&D 0.587*** 0.543*** - - 0.613*** 0.619*** 0.654*** 0.422*** 0.393 0.382 - - 
 (11.3) (11.32) - - (5.64) (5.81) (7.95) (5.69) (1.94) (1.93) - - 
Relative rent ICT 0.262* 0.517*** - - - - - - 0.602** 0.540** - - 
 (2.53) (5.43) - - - - - - (2.68) (2.62) - - 
Intangible capital - - 0.000408 0.0762*** - - - - - - 0.00712 0.191*** 
 - - (0.03) (6.14) - - - - - - (0.36) (13.68) 
Organizational capital 0.0396*** 0.102*** - - - - - - 0.0849*** 0.187*** - - 
 (4.25) (11.93) - - - - - - (3.62) (9.21) - - 
Organizational and ICT capital - - - - 0.0656*** 0.0961*** -0.00178 0.0484** - - - - 
 - - - - (3.99) (6.23) (0.09) (2.59) - - - - 
R&D capital 0.00235 0.0422*** - - 0.00171 0.0283 0.0448 0.114*** 0.0233 0.0364 - - 
 (0.25) (5.08) - - (0.09) (1.72) (1.88) (5.92) (1.03) (1.75) - - 
ICT capital -0.000202 0.0508*** - - - - - - -0.0244 0.0186 - - 
 (0.02) (4.47) - - - - - - (0.96) (0.79) - - 
Net plant, property, equipment 0.150*** 0.171*** 0.229*** 0.283*** 0.174*** 0.203*** 0.0997*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 (39.28) (51.3) (22.12) (36.52) (18.17) (24.85) (12.39) (15.99) (16.53) (18.32) (20.23) (27.95) 
Intangible asset dummy - - 0.0206 0.418*** - - - - - - 0.0447 0.976*** 
 - - (0.26) (5.75) - - - - - - (0.37) (10.74) 
OC (and ICT) asset dummy 0.234*** 0.588*** - - 0.424*** 0.631*** 0.015 0.312** 0.444** 1.082*** - - 
 (4.3) (11.8) - - (4.38) (6.95) (0.12) (2.87) (3.17) (9) - - 
R&D asset dummy 0.0156 0.247*** - - -0.0299 0.139 0.414** 0.893*** 0.1 0.183 - - 
 (0.28) (4.92) - - (0.28) (1.41) (2.61) (7.05) (0.74) (1.46) - - 
ICT asset dummy 0.01 0.265*** - - - - - - -0.116 0.0859 - - 
 (0.16) (4.67) - - - - - - (0.91) (0.73) - - 
Observations 34346 34346 7605 7605 9541 9541 6410 6410 5904 5904 4846 4846 
R Squared within 0.201 0.195 0.190 0.183 0.149 0.148 0.218 0.213 0.258 0.254 0.209 0.182 
sigma_e 0.469 0.469 0.389 0.389 0.505 0.505 0.479 0.479 0.419 0.419 0.461 0.461 
sigma_u 0.872 0.694 0.769 0.599 0.870 0.772 0.764 0.652 0.787 0.686 1.004 0.735 
rho 0.776 0.687 0.796 0.703 0.748 0.700 0.718 0.649 0.779 0.728 0.826 0.717 
All values except intangible worker shares are in logs. Year, industry dummies, and their interactions and dummies for no organizational, R&D and ICT capital are included. P values * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001 
  
The output elasticities of intangible capital vary substantially from one cluster to another, and 
therefore a single combined multiplier irrespective of the type of cluster, as assumed in 
expenditure-based approach, does not hold. An example is the low output elasticities in the fixed-
capital-intensive and other industry clusters. These clusters have relatively few intangibles, which 
are unproductive. 
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Note also that all estimates yield decreasing returns to scale if the quality of labor q is fixed. 
Increasing factor inputs and labor quality by the same amount and dropping the no-intangible-
capital dummies would instead lead to estimates closer to constant returns to scale. It is well 
known that more aggregated national data typically provide higher output elasticity estimates 
(Stiroh, 2010). 
 
In table 4, the three columns in each cluster report the output elasticity based on table 3, the rent 
multiplier ICjz , which is estimated as relative rents divided by relative wages (see (6) and the note 
in table 4) and the combined multiplier ICjM  (from (6) and (10)) using the preferred fixed effects 
estimates. The last row in the table reports the average figures (using value added shares as 
weights). 
Table 4. Output elasticities, rents ICz  = ,IC NON ITa ? / ,IC NON ITw ? and combined multipliers ICM in 
fixed effects estimation 
 
  Annual 
value 
added in 
billion 
€2000 
prices 
  Organizational  R&D ICT 
Industry Output elasticity 
Rent 
multiplier             
z 
Combined 
multiplier        
M 
Output 
elasticity 
Rent 
multiplier      
z 
Combined 
multiplier     
M 
Output 
elasticity 
Rent 
multiplier      
z 
Combined 
multiplier     
M 
Fixed-capital intensive 9 256          
   Industry fixed  0.04 % 6.04 0.002 0.04 % 6.23 0.002 0.0 % 6.18 0.00 
Fixed- and OC-
intensive 14 000          
   Industry fixed  6.6 % 1.22 1.41 0.2 % 1.96 0.04 6.6 % 1.63 2.50 
R&D-intensive 14 200          
   Industry fixed  0.00 % 0.94 0.000 4.5 % 1.63 0.44 0.0 % 1.13 0.00 
OC-intensive 7 468          
   Industry fixed  8.5 % 0.70 2.05 2.3 % 1.61 1.04 0.0 % 1.81 0.00 
Other industries 8 541          
   Industry fixed  0.7 % 5.88 0.03 0.7 % 6.08 0.04 0.7 % 6.03 0.07 
All           
Average 3.0 % 2.65 0.66 1.7 % 3.22 0.28 1.8 % 3.01 0.67 
Average total multiplier   0.68  0.48  1.14 
Rent is the relative rent divided by the relative wages. The organizational relative rent and wages in the fixed effects estimates are 10.55 and 2.32 in cluster 1, 3.26 and 0.48 in cluster 2, 1.8 
and 2.12 in cluster 3, 1.58 and 2.34 in cluster 4, 12.68 and 2.16 in cluster 5. The R&D relative rent and wages in the fixed effects estimates are 8.17 and 1.56 in cluster 1, 3.02 and 0.63 in 
cluster 2, 2 and 1.56 in cluster 3, 2.03 and 1.26 in cluster 4, 9.11 and 1.5 in cluster 5. The ICT relative rent and wages in fixed effects estimates are 8.7 and 1.71 in cluster 1, 3.26 and 0.65 in 
cluster 2, 1.8 and 1.76 in cluster 3, 2.46 and 1.46 in cluster 4, 9.84 and 1.63 in cluster 5.  
  
The 3% average of the output elasticities/coefficients of organizational capital over the years in 
the fixed effects estimation is close to the overall coefficient of 4% in Table 3, column 1. The 
average total multiplier of 0.68 exceeds the expenditure-based combined multiplier of 0.4 (which 
equals the total multiplier because rent multiplier is one). The mean and median values of 
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organizational capital are thus approximately 50% higher when using the performance- rather 
than expenditure-based approach, see summary Table 5. Organizational capital is concentrated in 
the organizational-capital-intensive and fixed- and organizational-capital-intensive clusters, 
representing 40% of total value added. 
 
The average of the output elasticities of R&D is low, at 1.7%, as obtained in the pooled 
estimation (first column in Table 3). The average total multiplier of 0.48 is two times lower than 
the unit value in the expenditure-based approach. Of R&D investment, 63% occurs in the R&D-
intensive cluster (engineering in construction, machinery and equipment and electrical equipment, 
as indicated by table 1) and the total multiplier of 0.71 in this cluster is also less than the 
combined multiplier of 1 used in the expenditure-based approach. The organizational-capital-
intensive cluster is the other cluster with notable R&D investment, where the total multiplier is 
high at 1.7.  
 
ICT investments are concentrated in the fixed-capital-intensive and R&D-intensive clusters 
according to the expenditure-based figures. The performance-based estimates instead highlight 
the clusters that intensively invest in fixed and organizational capital and other industries. The 
average total multiplier of 1.14 would exceed the 0.7 figure assumed for all clusters in the 
expenditure-based approach. 
 
Table 5 presents a summary of our results, including the intangibles per unit of value added 
(value added includes investments in intangibles).  
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Table 5. Summary of intangible capital 
Variable  Standard 
Businesses 
Mean Deviation Median Mean Median 
Value added (VA) at factor prices excluding 
intangibles 21,992 104,169 4,118   
Book value of assets 27,105 377,390 1,148   
Organizational capital expenditure-based 3,630 12,245 1047   
Organizational capital 5,583 14,708 1577   
R&D capital experience-based 7,094 29,773 1231   
R&D capital 4,409 19,408 554   
ICT capital experience-based 1,355 5,599 256   
ICT capital 6,575 36,364 840   
Organizational capital/VA expenditure-based 10.2 % 1.4 % 10.3 % 10.5 % 10.5 % 
Organizational capital/VA 12.1 % 0.5 % 12.1 % 35.9 % 34.7 % 
R&D capital/VA expenditure-based 16.5 % 2.4 % 15.8 % 16.2 % 16.6 % 
R&D capital/VA 9.7 % 1.1 % 9.2 % 29.4 % 28.1 % 
ICT capital/VA expenditure-based 1.7 % 0.3 % 1.8 % 1.7 % 1.7 % 
ICT capital/VA 4.1 % 0.4 % 4.4 % 12.1 % 12.3 % 
Fixed capital/VA 176 % 9.5 % 176 % 138 % 135 % 
Organizational investment/VA expenditure-
based 2.6 % 0.4 % 2.7 % 2.6 % 2.7 % 
Organizational investment/VA 3.0 % 0.4 % 2.8 % 8.9 % 8.4 % 
R&D investment/VA expenditure-based 3.1 % 0.6 % 2.9 % 2.8 % 2.8 % 
R&D investment/VA 1.6 % 0.3 % 1.5 % 5.0 % 4.7 % 
ICT investment/VA expenditure-based 0.6 % 0.1 % 0.6 % 0.6 % 0.6 % 
ICT investment/VA 1.4 % 0.3 % 1.4 % 4.0 % 4.1 % 
Performance-based measures of intangibles are used unless otherwise noted. 
 
Using performance-based, fixed effects estimates, the overall intangible capital investment is 6% 
(organizational investment 3% + R&D investment 1.6% + ICT investment 1.4%), and the 
intangible capital stock represents 26% of the business sector value added (organizational 
investment 12.1% + R&D investment 9.7% + ICT investment 4%). The overall intangible 
investment is the same using the expenditure-based approach. However, the results of the 
decomposition are very different. The experience-based estimates reveal extensive intangible 
investments in all clusters. It should also be noted that applying a different set of expenditure-
based multipliers, such as multipliers for all types that are two times lower, would not change the 
rent multipliers or output elasticities in the pooled performance-based estimation but, naturally, 
the cluster decomposition would be different. The performance-based value of intangible assets 
is thus relatively robust to the assumptions made in the creation of the expenditure-based 
estimates. 
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Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the intangible investment over the new value added, which also 
includes these types of investments. The figures are representative of the business sector 
(similarly as figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Intangible investment per unit of value added (1998–2011) 
 
The R&D investment rate of value added is on average 1.5%, while expenditure-based estimates 
had increased to 4% by 2011. Note here that Nokia has been dropped from the figures, and 
hence, part of the recent increase is explained by Nokia firing employees that are subsequently re-
employed elsewhere. The organization capital investment rate had increased to 3.5% by 2011, 
irrespective of the approach considered. ICT investments decreased when using the 
performance-based estimates, and hence also in the clusters that intensively invest in fixed and 
organizational capital and other industries. 
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Finally, in our study, labor productivity is 20-percentage-points higher using the performance-
based approach, and labor productivity growth is similar to the value observed when not 
accounting for intangible capital. Marrano et al. (2009), using the CHS methodology, found labor 
productivity growth to be 0.3%-0.4% stronger when accounting for intangible capital in the UK. 
They also attributed half of the higher value added to economic competences such as 
organizational capital and training provided by employers.  
 
5. Intangible capital and market value 
This section examines how intangibles affect forward-looking market values. The results of 
numerous studies (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang, 2002, Van Bekkum, 2008) appear to 
indicate that the value of intangibles materializes over a longer period, especially in such areas as 
business organization, finance, and healthcare. Intangible capital can explain the weak 
relationship found between value changes and accounting information in many studies, beginning 
with Lev (1989). Lev and Radhakrishnan (2003, 2005) use intangibles-related work as an 
instrument to explain sales growth in yearly industry-level estimates using the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method. These researchers find that the annual measures of organizational/ 
intangible capital predict the market value of the firm well in advance. Their proxy for 
organizational capital (selling, general and administration expenditures) would here have a high 
correlation of 0.96 with sales in our setting. Our model incorporates economic analysts’ forecasts 
using a residual income valuation model extended by Ohlson (1995). We thus account for the 
company’s already well-known prospects by including market forecasts in the analysis. The 
market value is equal to the present value of future dividends 
 
 
1
( ) 
(1 )
t it
it
i
E DIVMV
r
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??   (12) 
 
where itMV  is the market value of equity at time t, itDIV are the dividends received at the end of 
period t, ir  is the discount rate, and tE  is the expectation operator based on the information set 
at date t. Let itBV  = the sum of the balance-sheet value of assets net of liabilities and intangibles 
? ICitK , , & &IC OC R D I? . The clean surplus relationship reads as  
 
 1  it it it itBV BV FE DIV?? ? ? ,  (13) 
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where itFE  are the earnings for the period ending on date t, which are proxied by the analysts’ 
forecasts one year ahead (made in March for the upcoming year). We next use equations (12) and 
(13) and write the market value as a function of the book value and discounted expected 
abnormal earnings 
 
  it it itMV BV RE? ? ,  (14) 
 
where itRE  = 1
1
(1 ) [ ]i it i itr FE r BV
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??  is the present value of abnormal earnings at the end of 
year t, extrapolated to infinity. With the assumption that the total capital stock grows at a rate of 
less than 1 ir? , such that (1 ) ( ) 0t itr E B? ? ?? ? ?? ? , the residual earnings can be written as  
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where itg  is the growth rate of abnormal earnings, which is set at itr minus 3%. The abnormal 
earnings capture how well standard analysis can predict the future evolution of capital formation. 
In empirical estimates, the discount rate itr  is obtained from CAPM as the sum of the return on 
government bonds for the shortest period available (five years) and market returns using the 
systematic risk beta as the weight. The beta in the risk premium is estimated using the capital 
asset pricing model for the companies listed on the Finnish stock market. Thus, the beta for each 
year is estimated using observations from the preceding 60 months. The data employed include 
all of the companies listed on the Helsinki stock market during the period. 
 
We follow the typical linear market value model applied by Hall, Thoma, and Rorrisi (2007), 
among others. The firm’s assets enter additively, and hence we can write the estimable function 
under constant returns to scale 1? ?  as 
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 (16) 
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where itK  is physical capital, 
IC
itR is intangible capital of type IC, and itF  is the share of 
employment abroad. Note that the investment decision for period t depends on the expected 
evolution of abnormal earnings itRE , and this information also has a direct bearing on market 
values. The expected share price etq  is the average Tobin’s q or the ratio of market value to the 
replacement cost of abnormal earnings and tangible capital stock. The parameters ,RE IC? ?  are 
the respective marginal values of physical capital at a given point and the extent to which 
economic forecasts have not fully accounted for the marginal value of intangibles. A second 
novelty here is to account for the division of activities at home and abroad, and itF  denotes the 
foreign employment share. Employment at domestic plants remained at approximately half a 
million in our data, while employment abroad expanded from 137,000 in 1996 to nearly 400,000 
by 2006 according to data from the Bank of Finland regarding foreign direct investment. The 
listed firms that are included in our analysis were responsible for most of this internationalization. 
The share of foreign activities measures the degree of globalization, while all financial data are 
from unconsolidated balance sheets. 
 
Following the usual analysis, we define Tobin’s q with respect to physical capital. Our estimates 
are in logarithmic form, but similar to Hall, Thoma and Rorrisi (2007) and in contrast to several 
earlier approaches, we do not use the approximation log(1 / )ICit it itR K?? ?  / ,ICit itR K?  as 
intangibles are a notable share of total capital. The same strategy applies to the share of 
employment abroad, as the ratio increased from less than 10% to approximately 90% for the 
firms listed on the Helsinki stock market. Rearranging and taking the log yields  
 
        ln ln ln[1 ] ln[1 ]
IC
it it
it RE IC itIC
it it
RE RQ q F
K K
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? , (17) 
 
where /it it itQ MV K? . The intercept ln q  represents the average logarithm of Tobin’s q for the 
current total capital stock when the future evolution of assets, as expected by the standard 
economic analysis, is captured by abnormal profits (zero for a Tobin’s q equal to one). The 
parameter ICq?  represents the absolute hedonic price of the respective intangible capital 
component. The estimable equation is 
 
23 
 
 
         ln ln ln[1 ] log[1 ]
IC
it it
it RE IC it jt it
ICit it
RE RQ q F D e
K K
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? , (18) 
 
where jtD includes year and three industry dummies and their interaction terms. We can now test 
the extent to which the financial analysts account for the value and profit implications of 
intangible capital in their analyses and consequent earnings forecasts. Table 6 presents the 
summary table. Companies typically operate on a global scale. We use unconsolidated balance 
sheet data from the domestic forms linked to domestic worker characteristics, but half of the 
firms’ employees are located abroad. In the table, the unconsolidated balance sheets and 
intangible capital figures from domestic operations were revised upwards by multiplying them by 
the inverse of the share of employees in domestic plants. The assumption is thus that the balance 
sheet structure is identical at home and abroad. 
 
Table 6. Summary of variables: market value and balance sheets of listed companies 
Variable 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Median 
Value 
Obs  
Market Value (€ million) 2,953 2,816 1,839 753 
Analyst forecast profits (€ million) 408 ,665 ,142 635 
Abnormal earnings 3,341 6,303 ,534 753 
Book value (net of liabilities) (€ million) 1,067 1,178 ,619 753 
Total assets 14097 15,295 7231 753 
Fixed assets less liabilities 2,585 2,644 1,450 753 
Tobin's q 1.80 0.78 1.70 753 
Tobin's q including intangibles 1.70 0.72 1.60 753 
Organizational capital expenditure-based 195 153 176 753 
Organizational capital 96 172 8 753 
R&D capital expenditure-based 365 478 227 753 
R&D capital 159 320 12 753 
ICT capital expenditure-based 27 23 22 753 
ICT capital 26 44 3 753 
Organizational capital per total assets 2.7 % 5.2 % 0.0 % 753 
R&D capital per total assets 2.5 % 7.6 % 0.1 % 753 
ICT capital per total assets 0.7 % 1.3 % 0.0 % 753 
Employment abroad share 46.0 % 21.0 % 48.0 % 753 
 
Abnormal earnings are on average positive, indicating that companies experienced positive 
growth. Performance-based estimates reveal that intangible capital represents 5.9% of total assets 
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reported in balance sheets (the sum of fixed capital and current assets), of which organizational 
and R&D capital reflect equal shares of approximately 2.5%. The expenditure-based figures 
would be twice as large, indicating that organizational- (and to some extent R&D-) intensive 
firms are underrepresented among listed firms. The median value of Tobin’s q is 1.8, such that 
the fixed assets are overpriced when excluding intangibles (the denominator here is total assets 
and not the typical book value of assets). Including intangible capital such that the denominator is 
the sum of intangible capital and total assets lowers the Tobin's q to 1.7 because of the low 
average intangible intensity. The estimates of Tobin's q that are closer to unity are consistent with 
theory and are captured by the hedonic prices ICq?  in the estimations. Note that Nokia, which 
experienced a dramatic shift in market value from €11.4 billion in 1997 to €295 billion in 2000 
and then declined to €23.3 billion by 2011, is excluded from these estimates. However, dropping 
Nokia from the analysis does not change our results because firm-size weights are not used in the 
regressions. 
 
Intangible assets are not included in market value when performing the estimations to avoid 
multicollinearity. We use non-linear estimates and control for firm size (four size categories) and 
industry (four industries). The intangible capital elasticities with respect to Tobin’s q are provided 
by 
 ln  
ln 1
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it it
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, (19) 
Table 7 reports the regression results and the corresponding elasticities between Tobin’s q and 
the intangibles (and abnormal earnings). The model explains approximately 40% of the variation 
in net profits. A 100% increase in abnormal earnings increases Tobin’s q by approximately 8%, 
hence explaining approximately 3-4% of the variation in Tobin’s q. Intangibles also clearly have 
strong independent predictive power for market value in excess of that explained by standard 
economic theory. The market value elasticity of organizational capital is 7% in the expenditure-
based approach but 3% lower in the performance-based approach. In the expenditure-based 
approach, R&D capital has no market valuation effect, while the elasticity of ICT capital is 3%. 
In the performance-based approach, the opposite is true and R&D capital has a more significant 
elasticity of 3.5%, which is higher than that of organizational capital elasticity (2.7%). Rahko 
(2013) analyzed the reported R&D investments in a consolidated database and found the R&D 
elasticities to be somewhat higher, in the 5–9% range.  
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Table 7. Non-linear estimates explaining market value  
 
  
Expenditure-based Performance-based Manu-facturing Services 
Constant (average log Tobin's q) 0.0786 0.111 0.189* 0.243** 0.184 0.202 
 (0.96) (1.28) (2.39) (2.88) (1.91) (1.47) 
Abnormal earnings/ fixed capital 0.0784*  - 0.0776*  - 0.0506 0.169* 
 (2.25)   (2.49)   (1.5) (2) 
OC capital / fixed capital 1.453*** 1.563*** 0.421** 0.482** 0.475 0.36 
 (4.59) (5.01) (2.67) (3) (1.75) (1.35) 
R&D capital/fixed capital 0.0283 0.0236 0.372*** 0.406*** 0.751*** 0.537*** 
 (0.49) (0.4) (5.05) (5.57) (3.38) (3.7) 
ICT capital/fixed capital 7.661 9.732* -0.739 -0.964 -1.668 1.29 
 (1.84) (2.24) (0.96) (1.2) (1.85) (0.87) 
Employment abroad share 1.793*** 1.627*** 1.693*** 1.499*** 1.629*** 1.436*** 
 (8.68) (7.47) (8.33) (7.05) (7.71) (3.95) 
Observations 753 753 753 753 457 249 
R Squared total  0.41 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.42 
Average elasticity and standard errors using "delta" method     
Abnormal earnings/ fixed capital 0.022  - 0.023  - 0.018 0.030 
 (3.18)   (3.56)  (1.86) (4.27) 
OC capital / fixed capital 0.074 0.080 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.028 
 (4.94) (5.38) (2.86) (3.24) (1.85) (1.47) 
R&D capital/fixed capital 0.004 0.003 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.072 
 (0.49) (0.4) (6.12) (6.87) (3.93) (5.18) 
ICT capital/fixed capital 0.031 0.039 -0.008 -0.011 -0.020 0.012 
 (1.94) (2.38) (16.28) (1.15) (1.76) (0.92) 
Employment abroad share 0.453 0.431 0.440 0.412 0.423 0.416 
  (17.41) (14.34) (16.28) (13.06) (14.53) (7.43) 
Non-linear estimates by industry and year with robust t-statistics in parentheses. Estimation includes four firm 
size dummies, year and four industry dummies. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Hall et al. (2007) found that the mean elasticities of knowledge stocks are more significant: the 
elasticity of R&D capital is approximately 20%, and the elasticity of the patents/R&D ratio varies 
from 1% to 5%. Here, the total elasticity of intangible capital is less than one-half of that found 
by Hall. However, Cummins (2005) did not find that appreciable intangibles are associated with 
R&D capital. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the performance-based approach is able to capture R&D that has real 
market value. In industry-specific estimates using the performance-based approach, R&D capital 
also had a more positive significant effect on market values in services than in manufacturing 
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(columns 5-6 in Table 7). The performance-based approach underestimates organizational capital. 
The reason is that performance-based organizational capital is concentrated in the organizational-
capital-intensive cluster, and among the listed firms, this cluster only represents 2% of total value 
added and 8% of firm-year observations (in contrast to being 14% of all value added and 17% of 
firm-year observations among all non-listed and listed firms). ICT capital is also not significant in 
the performance-based estimates, which may be again explained by the entirely different cluster 
decomposition relative to the expenditure-based estimates. Finally, the share of employment 
abroad has a significant and positive effect on market value. Doubling employment abroad 
increases Tobin’s q by 50%. 
 
We can conclude that while the actual R&D investment level can be lower than the total 
organizational investment, this activity has a significant effect on the market valuation of listed 
firms. Expenditure-based organizational investment is also a better proxy for organizational 
investment among listed firms, as organizational-capital-intensive clusters are largely absent.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
Intangible capital investment is similar to fixed capital income investment in machinery and 
equipment during the last years of the period (2009-2011), in part because the factor income 
share attributable to fixed capital was halved, from approximately 22%-24% to 13%. Therefore, 
intangibles are becoming the dominant type of capital investment. However, industries are 
heterogeneous in their use of intangible investments and how various types of intangible 
investments complement one another. Thus, we employ a clustering method to evaluate firm 
production functions. 
 
Several studies, such as Stiroh (2010), have stressed the omitted variable problem resulting from 
failing to include organizational capital (improved workplace practices and firm re-engineering) to 
explain the large returns obtained in the production function estimates of ICT and R&D. On the 
other hand, conventional expenditure-based approaches appear to yield excessively uniform 
values to organizational and R&D capital stocks, irrespective of the type of cluster considered. 
Performance-based estimates indicate that the productivity of intangible investments is cluster 
specific. Management and marketing and R&D employees provide high future benefits for firms 
in the organizational-intensive cluster and among R&D-intensive firms. These clusters are 
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relatively large, representing 40% of private sector value added. However, the organizational-
capital-intensive cluster is underrepresented among listed firms. 
 
The total combined multiplier for R&D investment of 0.48 suggests that R&D effort also 
includes a greater amount of maintenance work that does not produce new investments. 
Assuming a uniform factor multiplier of 1.55 for intermediates and physical capital in R&D 
capital goods production – as in the expenditure-based approach – and a rent multiplier of 1.5 
would indicate that only approximately one-third of R&D work (0.48/1.55=0.31) is related to the 
production of R&D investment goods (or half in the R&D intensive sector). The share of 
workers in R&D in our study is 7%, while according to Statistics Finland, there were 41,000 
R&D workers in 2011 or 2.8% of private sector employment. The limited share of R&D workers 
representing R&D investment may hence be explained by the broad definition of R&D work 
(that included all non-intangible workers with lower or higher tertiary technical education). 
However, including those with technical education in the R&D staff is important in the service 
sector, as R&D occupations are not generally well defined. 
 
The average total multiplier in organizational investment of 0.68 suggests that a large component 
of organizational work relates to the production of organizational investment goods. Assuming a 
factor multiplier of 1.76 for intermediates and physical capital and a rent multiplier of 1 (as in the 
expenditure-based approach) indicates that approximately 40% (0.68/1.76=0.39) of such work is 
allocated to organizational occupations, which was also assumed in the expenditure-based 
approach. The performance-based approach thus justifies our initial assumption that 40% of 
working time of devoted to creating organizational capital goods, and not 20% as assumed in 
CHS. The share is, however, cluster specific as the performance-based approach revealed a 
significant concentration of organizational and R&D investment in clusters that intensively invest 
in these intangibles.  
 
Intangible capital is shown to be an important missing factor in q-theory. Intangible capital stocks 
explain the variations in the market values of firms listed on the Helsinki stock exchange during 
the 1998–2008 period. The forward-looking estimates of future profitability that include 
intangible capital thus play an important role. A 100% increase in intangible capital increases the 
firm’s market value by approximately 7% beyond that explained by the economic forecast. 
Performance-based R&D capital outperforms organizational capital in terms its effect on market 
value. The listed firms thus better capture the significance of R&D investment than that of 
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organizational investment. Listed firms are dominated by manufacturing firms that engage in 
relatively little organizational investment. However, organizational capital was also found to be 
significant using the broad, expenditure-based measure. Future research should further develop 
performance-based methodologies and market valuation models that are better adapted to the 
firm-level evaluation of intangibles and cluster composition. Our estimates also exclude 
purchased intangible assets and, especially, architectural design, mining exploration and financial 
innovations. 
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Appendix A.1 The occupational classification of workers 
  
Occupations Organizational 
worker 
R&D 
worker 
ICT 
worker 
   
Pr
od
uc
tio
n:
 n
on
-p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
or
ke
rs
 
Management, corporate planning Management   
Production and operating planning Management   
Construction planning, executive level Management   
Transportation and logistics, executive level Management   
Distribution, storage, forwarding, executive level Management   
Real estate, executive level Management   
Law and tax Management   
Finance and accounting, executive level Management   
Personnel recruitment and planning, executive level Management   
Personnel relations, executive level Management   
Health care, executive level Management   
Purchases planning Marketing   
Marketing Marketing   
Export sales Marketing   
Customer service, executive level Marketing   
General marketing Marketing   
Media  Marketing   
Publicity, executive level Marketing   
 Research, including implementation level  x  
 Development, including implementation level  x  
 Production process development  x  
 ICT management, including implementation level   x 
 ICT planning and maintenance   x 
 ICT advisory and information service executive level   x 
  Data security, general corporate safety      x 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
Executive level in all occupations Management   
General administration, law senior manager Management   
Personnel management manager Management   
Risk management, insurance manager Management   
Financial administration manager Management   
Official manager Management   
Purchases selling, executive and manager levels Marketing   
Customer service, publicity executive levels Marketing   
Advertising agency workers Marketing   
Research including implementation level  x  
Development   x  
Project management and project senior experts  x  
ICT management including implementation level   x 
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ICT planning and maintenance   x 
ICT advisory and information service   x 
Data security, general corporate safety      x 
In production, the workers with the lowest qualifications are excluded except for R&D and ICT work. In 
production, the qualification categories are: executive level, senior expert level, expert level and 
implementation level. All higher tertiary level technical workers are categorized as R&D workers if they are 
not another type of IC worker. 
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Table A.2 Clusters and the factor input share of the typical factor input, in parenthesis, for the 
most common industries  
 
Cluster, the most common industries’ value 
added shares in parentheses Obs Cluster share of 
value added 
OC factor 
input 
share 
R&D 
factor 
input 
share 
ICT 
factor 
input 
share 
Fixed 
investment 
factor 
input 
share 
Fixed-capital intensive 0.9: paper and pulp (0.41), 
transportation (0.17), electricity, gas, steam (0.1), 
wholesale, retail (0.07), real estate (0.04) 
7,781 17.4 % 3.6 % 2.9 % 0.4 % 90.4 % 
Fixed-capital 0.57 and OC-intensive 0.22: wholesale, 
retail (0.21), information (0.13), basic metal (0.08), 
chemicals (0.06), paper and pulp (0.05) 
9,640 26.5 % 21.7 % 15.3 % 2.9 % 56.5 % 
R&D-intensive 0.57: construction (0.22), machinery 
and equipment (0.21), electrical equipment (0.1), 
scientific (0.06), information (0.05) 
6,486 25.2 % 22.5 % 57.2 % 3.2 % 15.7 % 
Organizational-intensive 0.68: wholesale, retail (0.4), 
information (0.18), transportation (0.11), 
administrative (0.1), accommodation (0.07) 
5,971 14.3 % 68.4 % 8.7 % 4.3 % 16.7 % 
Other industries 0.68: information (0.15), arts 
recreation (0.15), financial (0.13), scientific (0.1), 
paper and pulp (0.07) 
4,930 16.5 % 25.2 % 16.6 % 2.8 % 52.5 % 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA
Department of Economics
Working Papers
  1. PETRI KUOSMANEN & JUUSO VATAJA (2002). Shokkien välittyminen asunto- ja osakemark-
kinoilla. 46 s.
  2. PETRI KUOSMANEN (2002). Asunto- ja osakesijoitukset optimaalisessa portfoliossa. 30 s.
  3. HANS C. BLOMQVIST (2002). Extending the second wing: the outward direct investment of 
Singapore. 20 s.
  4. PETRI KUOSMANEN (2005). Osakemarkkinoiden korkoherkkyys Suomessa. 20 s.
  5. PETRI KUOSMANEN (2005). Osakemarkkinat ja talouskasvu Suomessa 21 s.
  6. JUUSO VATAJA (2005). Finland’s macroeconomic development in EMU. Some initial experi-
ences.  16 s.
  7. JUUSO VATAJA (2005). Initial economic experiences in EMU – the case of Finland. 26 s.
  8. HANNU PIEKKOLA (2007). Actuarial fair pension reform: Postponed retirement and redistribu-
tion of pension wealth – Evidence from Belgium, Finland, Germany and Spain. 46 s.
  9. HANNU PIEKKOLA (2008). Kilpailukykyä tiedosta ja taidosta. Virkaanastujaisesitelmä. 18 s.
10. PETRI KUOSMANEN & JUUSO VATAJA (2008). The role of stock markets vs. the term spread 
in forecasting macrovariables in Finland. 31 s.
11. MERVI TOIVANEN (2009). Financial interlinkages and risk of contagion in the Finnish interbank 
market. 39 s.
12. MIKKO LINTAMO (2009). Technical change and the wage-productivity gap for skills: A com-
parative analysis between industries. 33 s.
13. HANNU PIEKKOLA (2009). Intangibles: Can they explain the unexplained. 38 s.
14. PEKKA ILMAKUNNAS & HANNU PIEKKOLA (2010). Intangible investment in people and pro-
ductivity.  44 s.
15. HANNU PIEKKOLA (2013). Intangible investment and market valuation. Revised version. 33 s.
16. PETRI KUOSMANEN & JUUSO VATAJA (2010). The role of the financial market variables in 
forecasting macrovariables in Finland: Does the financial crisis make a difference? 30 s.
17. PETRI KUOSMANEN & JUUSO VATAJA (2012). Forecasting economic activity with financial 
market data in Finland: Revisiting stylized facts during the financial crisis. 18 s. 
18. JAANA RAHKO (2013). Market value of R&D, patents, and organizational capital: Finnish evi-
dence. 40 s.
19. HANNU PIEKKOLA & JOHNNY ÅKERHOLM (2013). Tuottavuuden kehitysnäkymät ja aineet-
tomat investoinnit – onko meillä mittausohgelma? 21 s.
20. EERO KOSOLA (2013). Viennin rakennemuutos kohti palveluita osana OECD-maita. 22 s.
ISBN 978—952—476—515—2 (online)
Intangible Investment and
Market Valuation 
Revised Version 13.12.2013
HANNU PIEKKOLA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPERS 15
VAASA 2013ISBN 978—952—476—515—2 (online)
